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Abstract
We examine the eﬀects of changes in the income distribution in an economy
where agents’ utility depends both on consumption and on their rank in the
distribution of conspicuous consumption. We introduce a new methodology to
compare the behavior of agents that occupy the same rank in the two diﬀerent
income distributions but typically have diﬀerent levels of incomes. Here, an
increase in incomes of the least endowed improves their welfare, yet it also
increases social competition, making those in the middle to be worse oﬀ - even
if they have higher incomes as well. As social competition can be lowered by
spreading agents apart in income space, we find that an increase in incomes for
all, augmented by (weakly) increased income dispersion, constitutes a suﬃcient
condition for Pareto-improvement. We also show that one can have an increase
both in income and relative position but still be worse oﬀ.
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1 Introduction
The standard argument in support of economic growth rests on the assumption that
an increase in real income of every individual brings an increase in happiness for all.
However, Easterlin (1974, 1995) pointed out that data on happiness across time and
countries did not support this line of thought. Concerns with relative position are a
likely culprit, in that happiness increases significantly in cross-section even if average
happiness does not rise strongly in response to increases in average income. This has
lead to an increasing acceptance amongst economists that people may care about their
relative position as well as the absolute level of their consumption. For example, a
survey of empirical research on happiness goes as far as to conclude that in determining
happiness “It is not the absolute level of income that matters most but rather one’s
position relative to other individuals” (Frey and Stutzer, 2002, p411). The importance
of relative comparisons finds further support in more recent research (Brown et al.
(2008); Clark et al. (2008); Luttmer (2005)).
This raises two important questions. First, if relative concerns can weaken the
connection between economic growth and greater happiness, are there any conditions
under which all people in a society can be made happier by a rise in incomes, given
the presence of relative concerns? Second, if people do have relative concerns, it seems
a natural conclusion that greater inequality would lower the happiness of the middle
classes as distance between them and the rich becomes larger (Frank (1999)). This would
seem to give a new justification for policies to reduce inequality. But what exactly is
the relationship between equality and happiness when there are relative concerns?
In our current work, we analyze a model derived from that of Frank (1985), where
individuals decide how to divide their income between consumption of a normal good
and a positional good. For example, one might care about the characteristics of one’s
car, but also about how it compares to those of one’s neighbors. The choice of the
positional good is therefore strategic, in that consumption choices of my neighbors
aﬀect my payoﬀs, and my choice aﬀects theirs. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of the
resulting game will be Pareto ineﬃcient in that all will spend more on the positional
good than is privately optimal, but will result in no net change in relative position. We
find that greater equality provides greater incentives to spend on the visible positional
good as it becomes easier to surpass one’s neighbors. An increase in equality that raises
incomes at the lower end of the income distribution will make the poor better oﬀ. But
as an increase in equality increases the degree of social competition, the middle class
will be worse oﬀ - even if they have higher incomes as well. We find that even in the
presence of this social competition it is possible for economic growth to make all better
oﬀ: it is suﬃcient to raise incomes provided that at the same time there is no increase
in income density, or equivalently, no decrease in income dispersion.
In such a model changes in the income distribution can aﬀect agents through three
channels. One’s own income, one’s relative position or rank in the distribution, and the
shape of the distribution all matter. Of necessity, any analysis must hold at least of one
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of these constant. In our earlier work (Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)), we considered
changes in the distribution of income that left some people’s incomes unchanged. (For
example, imagine a change in taxes on earned income that does not aﬀect incomes of
those who do not work.) We then analysed the eﬀect of the change in the distribution
of income on equilibrium behavior and utility at each income level. We found that a
reduction of inequality of this type would lead to a fall in utility at low income levels.
In this paper, we develop a new set of techniques created specifically for problems of
social comparison. We re-examine games of status where agents care about their relative
position in terms of their rank in expenditure on a visible positional good, and analyze
consumer choice as a function of rank rather than income. This new methodology
allows us to compare the equilibrium behavior and well-being of every individual for a
pair of continuous income distributions, each having support on an interval, but these
intervals may have all, some, or no points in common.
Here, we find, as we did before, that an increase in equality increases the degree
of social competition. The closer individuals are together, the easier it is to overtake
others in status, thus giving a greater incentive to indulge in conspicuous consumption.
This means that the overall eﬀect of redistribution on the poor is ambiguous: they have
greater income, but more of it may be spent on wasteful consumption. Typically, with
their income increased, the poor are better oﬀ in a more equal society, yet the lower
middle class are worse oﬀ - even though they may also have higher income. This is
because the increased aﬄuence of those at the bottom results in their higher expenditure
on visible positional goods, forcing everyone further up the social ladder to increase their
spending as well in order to “keep up” - and for most, this increased expenditure on
positional goods comes at the expense of their expenditure of non-positional goods,
leading to a decline in post-redistribution welfare. The eﬀect on those with average or
greater income is definitely negative. This is in contrast to the eﬀect of a reduction
in inequality in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), where, for a given level of income, the
eﬀect on the rich was ambiguous, and on the poor was definitely negative.
We hope these seemingly contrasting results may help to explain why it has been
diﬃcult to establish empirically whether greater equality does in fact lead to greater
happiness. Clark (2003), using British panel data, finds a positive relationship between
inequality and self-reported happiness while Senik (2004) finds that inequality has no
statistical influence on life satisfaction in post-reform Russia. In contrast, Alesina et al.
(2004) find a negative relationship between inequality and happiness for both Europe
and the US. Our results suggest that, even in the presence of relative concerns, whether
greater equality does increase utility or happiness may depend quite sensitively on the
measure of equality considered and on the method of comparison.
In this paper, we also explore under what conditions an increase in the income of
each person makes everyone happier. We find that all agents will be better oﬀ when
all have an increase in income, and, further, incomes become no less dispersed. That
is, to prevent an increase in “social competitiveness” (by which we mean an increase in
the density of the income distribution), this increase in aﬄuence should spread agents
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apart - or at least not squeeze them together - in income space. That is, growth leads
to greater happiness if it raises the incomes of all without increasing equality.
Notice that our techniques allows us to avoid the problems of interpersonal com-
parisons as we can make ordinal comparisons of utilities for the same individual before
and after an income transformation. If the income transformation is rank-preserving,
each individual will have the same rank before and after the income transformation,
and thus we can apply our rank-indexing technique directly. We find that even if the
income transformation is not rank-preserving, one can still carry out ordinal compar-
isons for the same individual by correcting for ranks by means of a rank transformation
function. Non-rank-preserving transformations highlight the importance of the density
of the social space, as we provide an example where individuals may have both higher
income and higher rank, but because of the increased density of their social space they
may be worse oﬀ.
Both the model presented here and the model in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) can
also be interpreted as models of labor supply, as they can apply to situations where
individuals decide on how to allocate their endowment of productivity (rather than of
income) between labor and leisure, and where status or prestige is assigned to the most
productive workers. In equilibrium individuals choose a level of labor which is higher
than that which would be privately optimal - that is, in terms of labor supply, they
overwork. As increased education changes the productivity endowments (making the
“social space” to be less dispersed), the increased competition leads to further worker
dissatisfaction.1
One important aspect of our model is that, following Frank (1985) and Robson
(1992), we assume that an individual’s status is determined by her position in the dis-
tribution of conspicuous consumption, with higher position meaning higher status. That
is, here we assume status is ordinal, and depends on how many others one surpasses.
An alternative form would be some form of cardinal status, depending, for example,
on the distance between one’s own and others’ consumption. The cardinal case has
been analysed by Clark and Oswald (1998) and Friedman and Ostrov (2008) (see also
Hopkins (2008) for a brief survey) but not for the case of a heterogeneous population
considered here.
Status is necessarily defined relative to some comparison group. Here, this is as-
sumed to be the whole population rather than a smaller group, such as those having
similar incomes or those in the local neighborhood. Defining the appropriate com-
parison group is an important task for empirical work on relative concerns - see, for
example, the survey by Clark et al. (2008). However, there are strong arguments that
the comparison across the population is the most important. As Wilkinson and Pickett
(2006, p1776) put it, “our recognition of our class status is constituted primarily by
our recognition of uncontestable status diﬀerences”. In other words, concentrating our
comparisons on those who are near to us in status is only possible after classifying who
1See Schor (1991) and (1998) for a vivid description of both overspending and overworking behavior
by modern Americans.
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is close and who is not. That is, it requires some recognition of one’s global position,
rich, poor or somewhere between.
The ordinal specification is, in fact, very sensitive to local conditions. As we show,
what drives an individual’s behavior is the income density at her rank in the income
distribution. The point is that individuals with a concern with rank wish to rise in the
rankings. To do so, they are in competition with those around them. They might like
to be at the top of the distribution, but what is important for equilibrium behavior is
their competition with their neighbors.
Finally, our work adds to a growing literature in economics on the theory of relative
concerns. Here, for a general specification of primitives, we look at how macroeconomic
aggregates such as economic growth and inequality aﬀects individual decisions and
welfare. The earlier literature (including Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992), Corneo
and Jeanne (1997, 1999), Cooper, García-Peñalosa and Funk (2001), and many others)
looked instead at the eﬀects of relative concerns on economic growth. Dubey and
Geanokopolos (2005), Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2005) and Dhillon and Herzog-Stein
(2005) all consider the design of optimal incentives when agents are motivated by status
as well as or instead of money. However, the paper that is closest in methodology to
our own is the paper by Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009). This paper considers
signalling tournaments, and amongst other questions examines the eﬀect on equilibrium
strategies and total welfare of an increase in the dispersion of the distribution of types,
using stochastic orders of a similar type to those employed here.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model and
show that strategies and equilibrium outcomes can be written in terms of rank in the
distribution of income. In Section 3 we compare the two methodologies in games of
status - one indexing individuals by their level of income, and the other indexing by rank.
In Sections 4 and 5 we utilize the concept of dispersive ordering and conduct comparative
static analysis. In Section 6 we show that our techniques can be useful for comparing
individual’s choices and welfare for non-rank-preserving income transformations. In the
conclusion, we discuss the applicability and limitations of both methodologies.
2 The Model
Following Frank (1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), we consider a simple model
where individuals care about their social status as determined by their relative con-
sumption of a visible or positional good. Specifically, we assume an economy consisting
of a continuum of agents, identical except in terms of income. Each individual’s income
z is private information and is an independent draw from a common distribution. This
is described by a distribution function G(z) which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
with a strictly positive density on some interval [z, z¯] with z ≥ 0. Income is divided be-
tween expenditure on visible, conspicuous consumption and on regular non-conspicuous
consumption. Agents’ utility depends on status S, the absolute level of consumption
4
of the visible good x and the consumption of another (non-positional) good y, the
consumption of which is not directly observable by other agents.
Agents’ choices of conspicuous consumption are aggregated in a distribution of con-
spicuous consumption F (·), with F (x) being the mass of individuals with consumption
less than or equal to x. Following Frank (1985) and Robson (1992), an agent’s status
will be determined by her position in this distribution of conspicuous consumption, with
higher position meaning higher status. Following Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), we
define status as follows:
S(x, F (·)) = γF (x) + (1− γ)F−(x) + S0 (1)
where x is individual’s consumption, γ ∈ [0, 1), F (x) is the mass of individuals with
consumption less or equal to x, and F−(x) = limx0→x− F (x0) is the mass of individuals
with consumption strictly less than x. The current formulation is a way of dealing with
ties. For example, if all agents chose the same level of consumption in a sense they
would all be “equal first”, but perhaps not as happy as someone who was uniquely
first. To reflect this, the current assumption would award them status equal to γ
which is strictly less than one.2 In contrast, if the distribution of consumption F (x)
is continuous, there are no ties, the above measure of status is identical to rank in
consumption, or S(x, F (·)) = F (x). The parameter S0 ≥ 0 is a constant representing
a guaranteed minimum level of status, reflecting the intensity of social pressures. We
discuss its role below (following the system of equations (7)).
We follow Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), and assume that individuals have identical
preferences over absolute consumptions and status as follows:
U(x, y, S(x, F (·))) = V (x, y)S(x, F (·)) (2)
In eﬀect, V (·) is a conventional utility function over the two goods, x and y, and
we assume that it is non-negative, strictly increasing in both its arguments, strictly
quasiconcave and twice diﬀerentiable. We further assume that Vii ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2
and that Vij ≥ 0 for i 6= j. This formulation assumes the convenient form that utility
is multiplicatively separable in status.3 Agents simultaneously decide how to allocate
their endowment z between consumption of a positional good x and of a non-positional
good y. Let p be the price of the positional good with the price of the non-positional
good is normalized to one. Given the assumptions on V (·), the budget constraint will
hold with equality and an agent with income z faces the following problem,
max
x
V (x, z − px)
¡
γF (x) + (1− γ)F−(x) + S0
¢
subject to x ∈ [0, z/p]. (3)
As individuals are in competition for status, their choice of consumption of diﬀerent
types of goods will be strategic. Note that the distribution of conspicuous consumption
2This also gives agents an incentive to break any ties, so, as we will see, there will be no ties in
equilibrium. See Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) for a full rationale of this specification.
3We believe what is important is that there is (weak) complementarity, i.e. supermodularity, be-
tween the three goods, x, y and S. We go on to explore a more general utility formulation in Hopkins
and Kornienko (2008).
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F (·) is endogenously determined, so is social status S(x, F (·)). Thus, a rational indi-
vidual makes a consumption choice in anticipation of consumption choices of all other
individuals, i.e. is engaged in a game of status. It is possible to solve the resulting game
but the solution will, however, depend on the distribution of income in society. This
game has a formal resemblance to a first-price auction, as increasing one’s conspicuous
consumption leads to a trade-oﬀ between the increase in status and the decrease in non-
conspicuous consumption component of utility, just as a bidder in an auction trades oﬀ
an increase in probability of winning for lower realized profits in the event of winning.
In games of incomplete information, it is customary to identify individuals by their
type, which is a draw from an exogenous distribution of characteristics. Since in the
games of status we consider, agents only diﬀer in terms of income, one may find it
natural to take an agent’s type to be her income z - as it is done in Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004). However, given an income distribution G(z), an agent of income
z˜ has rank r˜ = G(z˜) and it is equally valid to think of his type as being r˜ as much
as it is z˜.4 We can also write his income as a function of his rank or z˜ = G−1(r˜)
(i.e. z˜ is at the r˜-quantile). Note an important distinction. While in everyday speech,
“rank” and “status” are almost synonymous, here we use the two terms to signify two
diﬀerent things. Rank we take to be an agent’s true, exogenous rank in the underlying
distribution of income, or r = G(z). Status S, however, is endogenously determined by
visible expenditure on positional goods in comparison with the expenditures of others
according to the function (1). There are several advantages to this rank-based approach
which we discuss in Section 3.
Thus, in this paper we define the game of status as the game between a continuum
of agents each having type r ∈ [0, 1], income G−1(r) and payoﬀ function (2). All agents
make a simultaneous choice of conspicuous consumption x, subject to a constraint that
it is feasible given income G−1(r), or x ∈ [0, G−1(r)/p]. Following the convention in
games of incomplete information, an agent’s strategy is a mapping from type to action
and, thus, here a strategy is x(r) : [0, 1] → [0, G−1(r)/p], a map from rank in income
to expenditure on the conspicuous good. By the same convention, a symmetric Nash
equilibrium is one in which all agents use the same strategy.5 So, to summarize, the game
can be written formally in terms of players indexed by their rank, the relation between
their type and their income given by the inverse distribution function, action space,
strategy set and payoﬀs: {r ∈ [0, 1];G−1(r) : [0, 1] → [z, z¯];x ∈ [0, G−1(r)/p];x(r) :
[0, 1]→ [0, G−1(r)/p];V (x,G−1(r)− px)S(x, F (·))}.
To find such an equilibrium, suppose all agents adopt the same strictly increasing,
diﬀerentiable strategy x(r) and consider whether any individual agent has an incentive
to deviate.6 Suppose that instead of following the strategy followed by the others, an
4We have assumed that G(·) is strictly increasing on its support so that there is a one-to-one relation
between income and rank.
5We do not formally rule out asymmetric equilibria but they are not likely to exist given that this
game is very similar to a standard first price auction that is known not to have asymmetric equilibria
(see, e.g. Maskin and Riley, 2003).
6Hopkins and Kornienko (Proposition 1, 2004) showed that equilibrium strategies are necessarily
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agent with rank ri chooses xi = x(r˜), that is, she consumes as though she had rank
r˜. Note first that F (xi) = x−1(xi) = r˜, resulting in Si = S0 + r˜, and second that her
utility would be equal to
U = V (x(r˜), G−1(ri)− px(r˜))(S0 + r˜).
We diﬀerentiate this with respect to r˜. Then, given that in a symmetric equilibrium,
the agent uses the equilibrium strategy and so r˜ = ri, this gives the first order condition,
V (xi, G−1(ri)−pxi)+(S0+ri)x0(ri)
¡
V1(xi, G−1(ri)− pxi)− pV2(xi, G−1(ri)− pxi)
¢
= 0.
(4)
This first order condition therefore defines a diﬀerential equation,7
x0(r) =
V (x,G−1(r)− px)
pV2(x,G−1(r)− px)− V1(x,G−1(r)− px)
1
S0 + r
=
φ(x,G−1(r))
S0 + r
(5)
Two important points to recognize are that, first, this diﬀerential equation and the
equilibrium strategy, which is its solution, both depend on the distribution of income
through the relation z = G−1(z). Thus, changes in the distribution of income will change
behavior. Second, the solution x(r) gives the inverse of the equilibrium distribution of
consumption. That is, given that in equilibrium r = F (x), we have x(r) = F−1(r).
Our next step is to specify what Frank (1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) call
the “cooperative choice”, which is an optimal consumption choice (xc(r), yc(r)) when
an individual does not or cannot aﬀect her social status. Specifically let us assume that
status depends on underlying rank, but is independent of consumption, so that S =
S0+ r. Then consumers’ choices would correspond to the standard tangency condition:
V1(xc, yc)/V2(xc, yc) = p. Given the budget constraint pxc(r)+ yc(r) = G−1(r), one can
rewrite the above tangency condition as:
V1(xc(r), G−1(r)− pxc(r))
V2(xc(r), G−1(r)− pxc(r))
= p. (6)
Let xc(r) be the strategy implied by the above condition. The cooperative strategy also
is used in the boundary condition for the diﬀerential equation (5).
In fact, the equilibrium behavior of the poorest individual is quite diﬀerent in the two
diﬀerent cases, where S0 minimum guaranteed status is zero, and when it is positive.
strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable.
7As we will see, the analysis of equilibrium choices under rank-indexing approach is much simpler
than under income-indexing approach. To see that, compare equation (5) to the equation 6 in Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004):
dx(z)
dz
=
µ
g(z)
S0 +G(z)
¶µ
V
pV2 − V1
¶
=
dx(r)
dr
dr
dz
=
dx(r)
dr
g(z)
In other words, under income-indexing, the analysis of equilibrium decisions is complicated by the
presence of income density g(z) in the diﬀerential equation. As we will see later on (see footnote 13),
the reverse is true of the analysis of equilibrium utilities.
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This is because in any symmetric equilibrium, the poorest individual will have the
lowest status. The question is what is the optimal response to this. In fact, the initial
conditions, or the choices of the individual with the lowest rank zero are:
S0 = 0 ⇒ x(0) =
G−1(0)
p
S0 > 0 ⇒ x(0) = xc(0) (7)
When S0 is positive, the lowest ranked individual does not take part in social compe-
tition and spends only the cooperative amount on visible consumption. In complete
contrast, when S0 = 0, low ranked individuals are desperate and spend all their endow-
ment in a futile attempt to get ahead.8
Given the smooth mapping z = G−1(r), one can adapt the result of Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004, Proposition 1) to show the following.
Proposition 1 The diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary conditions (7) has a unique
solution which is an essentially unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game of sta-
tus. Equilibrium conspicuous consumption x(r) is greater than in the absence of status
concerns, that is x(r) > xc(r) on (0, 1].
The equilibrium is only “essentially” unique as, when S0 = 0, other equilibrium be-
havior is possible for the agent with the lowest income. Specifically, given the necessary
condition for equilibrium limz→z+ x(z) = z/p, the agent with income z will always have
rank zero and always have zero utility and so is indiﬀerent between any choice of x on
the range [0, z/p]. The specific boundary condition that x(0) = G−1(0)/p, she spends
all her income, is not crucial to our analysis but is used for convenience.
Proposition 1 also implies that the equilibrium strategy x(r) is Pareto-dominated
by the cooperative choice xc(r). Note that, given the status function (1) and that in
equilibrium r = F (x), status is S = r + S0, exactly corresponding to underlying rank,
just as in the cooperative case. However, equilibrium conspicuous consumption is higher
at nearly every rank. Welfare is therefore higher at every rank, except the lowest, in
the cooperative case. Thus, in equilibrium everyone spends too much. Further, as we
will see, changes in the income distribution that force individuals to spend even more
can make them worse oﬀ.
3 Indexing by Rank vs. Indexing by Income
Our principal interest is to explore the eﬀect of changes in income distribution on each
agent’s equilibrium behavior and well-being. This approach avoids the controversy
8In eﬀect, S0 = 0 represents a situation where being the lowest-status individual is deadly (“devil
takes the hindmost”) which induces desperation. With no such threat, that is with S0 positive, the
lowest-ranked individual has little incentive to compete in a race that in equilibrium he always loses.
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surrounding interpersonal comparability of welfare. Furthermore, it would also be useful
in issues of political economy to determine which agents benefit from interventions such
as redistributive policies. However, a question arises - how do we “fix” a particular
agent.
In this paper we index individuals by their rank r = G(z) in the income distribution
G(z), and write strategies and equilibrium utilities as functions of an agent’s rank r,
i.e. x(r) and U(x(r), G−1(r) − px(r), S0 + r) = U(r) respectively. This is in contrast
to Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), where individuals are indexed by their income z =
G−1(r), and equilibrium consumption choices and equilibrium utility are written as
functions of income z, or x(z) and U(x(z), z − px(z), S(z)) = U(z) respectively. As
we will show in this section, the array of diﬀerences between the two approaches is
surprisingly rich, and thus is worthy of clarification.
First, the income-indexing approach used in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) utilized
the comparative statics techniques developed in the literature on first-price sealed-
bid auctions. While this approach to games of status has proved to be useful, its
applicability is limited to the income transformations that do not change the support
of the income distribution. For example, it cannot be used to explore a policy-relevant
redistributive scheme which raises the income of all those with below average income,
while taxing all those with above average income. To see this, imagine the lowest
income ex ante was $5000, but ex post was $6000. We cannot compare how it feels to
have $5000 before and after the changes, as after the changes there is no-one with that
income.
Second, the rank-indexing technique might be attractive to policy makers who are
interested in what happens to those occupying a particular social position - say, the
average or median individual, or the bottom or top decile. Instead, if a policy maker
is interested in the eﬀect of a policy that may leave the situation of some individuals
unchanged, the income-indexing approach is more of use. Consider, for example, a
case where every individual with income z has higher rank under the initial income
distribution Ga(z) than under the stochastically higher income distribution Gp(z), or
Ga(z) > Gp(z) for almost all z (see the top right panel of Figure 1). Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004) show that, in this case, equilibrium utility U(z) falls at almost every
level of income, i.e. Ua(z) > Up(z) for almost all incomes z (the bottom right panel).
In other words, when the income distribution improves in the sense of stochastic dom-
inance, so that some people’s incomes grow, someone whose own income is unchanged
- say an individual with income z0, - is made worse oﬀ by the improved situation of
others (i.e. Ua(z0) > Up(z0)). That is, by making comparisons at constant income, one
can look at those who were left behind by such a change, rather than at those who
benefitted from it.
Third, these two diﬀerent approaches generate results that sometimes can seem
contradictory. Consider again the case of a first-order stochastic dominance change in
the income distribution, and let us now compare utilities at a constant rank. Fix the
individual with income z0 and rank r0 in the initial distribution Ga, and suppose she
9
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Ua(z)
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Ua(r)
Up(r)
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Figure 1: Comparative statics: income indexing vs. rank indexing. The top right
panel represents the relationship between income and rank for two distributions Ga and
Gp, with Gp being stochastically higher than Ga. The bottom right panel represents
the comparative statics of welfare under the income indexing approach of Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004). The top left panel represents the comparative statics of welfare under
the new rank-indexing approach.
has the same rank r0 in the new distribution Gp (see the top right panel of Figure
1). Figure 1 shows a result that we will go on to prove in Section 5: this individual
can have greater utility in the new distribution, i.e. Up(r0) > Ua(r0) (in the top left
panel). However, this is not a contradiction to the above-mentioned result of Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004). This is because since she still occupies the same rank position
in the new distribution Gp, she will have the higher income z1.9 Her utility of her new
income z1 in the new distribution Gp exceeds her utility of her old income z0 in the
old distribution Ga (the bottom right panel). Thus, the two methods are two diﬀerent
ways of looking at the same phenomenon.
Fourth, the two methods rely on diﬀerent ways to assess social competitiveness,
9By the definition of stochastic dominance Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z) for all z. This implies that, for a given
income one’s rank is lower in the stochastically higher distribution, and for a given rank, one’s income
is higher in the higher distribution.
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rg(z)
zdG
−1(r)
dr
ra = Ga(z)
ra = Ga(z)
rp = Gp(z)
rp = Gp(z)
gp(z)
ga(z)
dG−1p (r)
dr
dG−1a (r)
dr
z¯
1
Figure 2: Densities vs. inverse densities. The top right panel represents the relationship
between income and rank for two distributions Ga and Gp, with Gp being more “equal”
than Ga. The bottom right panel represents the densities of the two distributions, ga(z)
and gp(z). The top left panel represents the inverse densities of the two distributions,
dG−1a (r)
dr and
dG−1p (r)
dr .
which is central to the games of status. Observe that because income and rank stand
in a reciprocal relationship to each other, the density of the individual’s “rank space”
is reciprocal of the density of her “income space”:
dG−1(r)
dr
=
1
g(G−1(r))
=
1
g(z)
(8)
Thus, the two sides of the “social coin” aﬀect the return to happiness in a reciprocal
way. In other words, take people around a given individual with rank r. The more
densely packed are these individuals in the “rank space” - and, reciprocally, the more
sparsely packed they are in the “income space” - the higher is the marginal return to
happiness from rank, and vice versa (see Figure 2). This observation will be important
for our argument to follow.
Fifth, one might be interested in total or average social welfare as well as the welfare
of individuals. Under the income based approach, it was diﬃcult to make comparisons.
While average social welfare is equal to
R
U(z)dG(z), it is often diﬃcult to calculate
whether it rises. For example, in the situation illustrated in the right hand side of
Figure 1, it is not clear whether average welfare is higher under income distribution
Ga or distribution Gp. Individual utility is lower at each level of income under Gp.
However, asGp is stochastically higher, there are more rich people, who have high utility.
Overall, the comparison is ambiguous. However, the equivalent expression for social
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welfare under the rank approach is
R
U(r)dr. Therefore, if utility rises at each rank,
it is necessarily true that social welfare must have risen. Under the income indexing
approach, it is also diﬃcult to determine the eﬀect of such changes on the distribution
of consumption. Even if we know the solution x(z), total consumption again depends
on an integral
R
x(z)dG(z) which can be diﬃcult to interpret. However, under the rank-
based approach, we have x(r) = F−1(r), so that if, for example, xp(r) ≥ xa(r) on [0, 1],
then we know immediately that the ex post distribution of consumption stochastically
dominates the ex ante distribution.
Sixth, in order to get clear-cut analytical results, each method calls for an appro-
priate partial ordering of income distributions. The income-indexing approach employs
the concepts of first and second order stochastic dominance, as well as their strength-
enings based on the likelihood ratio order, or the ratio of densities (which is the ratio
of competitiveness in the income space). Here we develop novel techniques that use
a less-known way of ordering distributions based on the ratio of the inverse densities
(which is the ratio of competitiveness in the rank space).
In particular, here we use the dispersive ordering discussed in detail by Shaked
(1982) (see also references therein) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994).10 Let F
and G be two arbitrary continuous distribution functions each with support on an
interval. However, these two intervals do not have to be identical or even to overlap.
Let F−1 andG−1 be the corresponding left-continuous inverses (so that F−1(r) = inf{z :
F (z) ≥ r}, r ∈ [0, 1] and G−1(r) = inf{z : G(z) ≥ r}, r ∈ [0, 1]), and let f and g be
the respective densities. Income in the society with income distribution F is said to
be smaller in the dispersive order (or less dispersed) than income in the society with
income distribution G (denoted as F ≺disp G) whenever
F−1(r2)− F−1(r1) ≤ G−1(r2)−G−1(r1) whenever 0 < r1 ≤ r2 < 1
That is, the income diﬀerence between individuals ranked r1 and r2 in both societies is
no greater in the society with distribution F then in the society with distribution G.
This implies that the income increase that an individual with rank r and income z gets
by moving from the distribution F to more dispersed distribution G is progressive with
both rank r and income z, i.e. G−1(r) − F−1(r) is increasing in rank r for r ∈ (0, 1)
and G−1(F (z))− z increases in z. Finally, when both distributions have finite means,
if F is less dispersed than G then VarF (z) ≤ VarG(z) whenever VarG(z) <∞.
In what follows we will use heavily the location-free feature of the dispersive order,
which implies that adding an arbitrary constant to everyone’s income in one society
(z → z + c where c is a real number) will preserve the dispersive order. This would
imply that F ≺disp G if and only if F (z − c) crosses G(z) at most once and, when it
does cross, it crosses from below. Shaked (1982, Remark 2.3) pointed out the following
10Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) look at equilibrium strategies and total welfare in assortative
matching models using stochastic orderings which are closely related to the dispersive ordering - see
Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994).
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important consequence of the location-free features of the dispersive order:
F ≺disp G if and only if f(F−1(r)) ≥ g(G−1(r)) whenever r ∈ (0, 1). (9)
That is, for a fixed rank, the more dispersed distribution is less dense than the less
dispersed one when compared at the corresponding incomes. Note that because the
condition (9) is expressed in terms of ranks, there is no problem in comparing distrib-
utions with diﬀerent, even disjoint, supports.
The location-free features of the dispersive order imply that the dispersive ordering
does not have a clear relationship with first and second order stochastic dominance,
concepts that may be more familiar to economists. To see that, suppose G(z) is uniform
on [0, 1] and F1(z) is uniform on [0, 0.5], while F2(z) is uniform on [0.25, 0.75]. One can
verify that the distributions F1 and F2 are equal in the dispersive order, butG dominates
both F1 and F2 in a sense of dispersive order (i.e. F1 ∼disp F2 ≺disp G). However, G first
(and thus second) order stochastically dominates F1, but F2 second (but not first) order
stochastically dominates G (and of course F2 first (and thus second) order stochastically
dominates F1). As will be seen, for the problems that we are concerned with here the
dispersive order will be more useful than stochastic dominance.
4 The Eﬀects of a Change in the Distribution of
Income on Equilibrium Behavior
Suppose a society experiences a change in the distribution of income, or an income
transformation - for example, because of economic growth, or because of redistributive
taxation, or for any other reason. Let us denote the ex-ante cumulative distribution
of income as Ga(z), and the ex-post cumulative distribution of income as Gp(z), each
distribution being continuously diﬀerentiable with densities ga(z) and gp(z) that are
strictly positive on their respective supports. In addition, we make the relatively strong
assumption that the two distributions are distinct from each other except at a finite
number of points (specifically there is no interval in [0, 1] where the two inverse distrib-
ution functions G−1a (r) and G−1p (r) are equal).11 But note that, in contrast to Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004), here we do not require the two distributions to have the same
support, the two distributions can have no points in common.
We will consider how changes in the distribution of income aﬀect conspicuous con-
sumption and welfare. We first start with equilibrium strategies. We show that an
increase in income for those with low rank will raise their expenditure on conspicuous
consumption.12
11This has the advantage that consequently the respective equilibrium strategies and utilities will be
similarly distinct. Without this assumption, our results would go through but in terms of weak rather
than strict inequalities.
12Strictly speaking, the inequalities of Proposition 2 and subsequent results should be qualified as
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Proposition 2 Suppose that ex post incomes are (weakly) higher, that is G−1p (r) ≥
G−1a (r), on an interval [0, rˆ] where rˆ is the point of first crossing of G−1p (r) and G−1a (r).
Then xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and ex post equilibrium consumption is higher almost everywhere
on that interval, that is xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ].
Note that if the ex post distribution (first order) stochastically dominates the ex
ante distribution this would imply
G−1p (r) ≥ G−1a (r), r ∈ [0, 1]⇔ Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z), z ∈ [0,∞). (10)
Note that this implies that after the change in question, income is (weakly) higher at
every rank in society. Combined with the previous proposition we can see that in a
stochastically higher distribution of income (almost) all individuals will spend more on
conspicuous consumption and lead to a stochastically higher distribution of consumption
(remember x(r) = F−1(r)).
Corollary 1 Suppose that ex post incomes are (weakly) higher everywhere, G−1p (r) ≥
G−1a (r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Then ex post conspicuous consumption is almost everywhere
higher, i.e. xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1], and thus ex post consumption is
stochastically higher, i.e. F−1p (r) ≥ F−1a (r).
Note that one can restate the above corollary as follows. If the ex-post income
distributionGp first-order stochastically dominates the ex-ante distributionGa, then the
ex-post distribution of visible consumption Fp also first-order stochastically dominates
the ex-ante distribution of consumption Fa. Simply put, greater aﬄuence for all leads
to greater visible consumption by all.
Consider now an income transformation where the poorest individual has an increase
in income, and the ex-post distribution is more dispersed than the ex-ante one, in the
sense of the dispersion order introduced in the previous section. In fact, it is easy to
see that such an income transformation results in an ex-post distribution first-order
dominating the ex-ante one. Thus we have the following simple result.
Corollary 2 Suppose that ex post income for the lowest ranked is no lower
G−1p (0) ≥ G−1a (0) (11)
and also that ex post incomes are more dispersed
gp(G−1p (r)) ≤ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Gp Âdisp Ga (12)
only holding almost everywhere. Specifically, equality between xp and xa is possible at isolated points
where both G−1a (r) = G−1p (r) and ga(G−1a (r)) = gp(G−1p (r)) hold simultaneously. Of course, we could
rule this out with further technical assumptions designed specifically to exclude this possibility. How-
ever, the only result where such a non-generic situation may be qualitatively important is Proposition
3 below, where we cannot rule out the possibility of such a non-generic crossing of xp and xa at the
point of interest.
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then ex post conspicuous consumption is higher almost everywhere, that is, xp(0) ≥ xa(0)
and xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1].
However, as we will show in the next section, the increased aﬄuence of those at the
“bottom”, by pushing those “further up” to spend more on conspicuous goods, will tend
to adversely aﬀect the welfare of those in the “middle” - regardless of what happened
to their incomes. Thus, even if everyone in the economy is richer, it does not necessary
mean that everyone is happier.
Proposition 2 is also instrumental in understanding what happens if the distribution
of income becomes more equal, for example, when a redistributive taxation scheme is
imposed. Using similar reasoning, we now look at consumption decisions when income
becomes more equal, or less dispersed in a sense of the dispersive ordering. Such a
transformation implies that the distributions cross at some point rˆ (the dispersive order
and our assumption that the two distributions are almost everywhere distinct imply that
there would be at most one such point). Then everyone at the lower end of the income
hierarchy up to the individual with rank rˆ will have a higher income and spend more
on conspicuous consumption. This is over and beyond the standard eﬀect of increased
income on the demand for a normal good, because the individual with rank rˆ will
spend more on conspicuous consumption even though her income has not changed.
All those who are “below” her in the income hierarchy have become richer after the
transformation, and thus are able to aﬀord more conspicuous consumption. As the
result, in order to “keep up” her social rank (as determined by the relative position in
the consumption hierarchy), the individual with rank rˆ now has to spend more.
Corollary 3 Suppose that ex post income for the lowest ranked is higher
G−1p (0) > G
−1
a (0) (13)
and also that incomes ex post are less dispersed
gp(G−1p (r)) ≥ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ga Âdisp Gp (14)
and also suppose that ex post income of the highest ranked is lower
G−1p (1) < G
−1
a (1) (15)
Then, ex post conspicuous consumption is higher almost everywhere for relatively low
ranks. That is, xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ] where rˆ is the only point of
crossing of G−1a (r) and G−1p (r).
Here, everyone at the lower end of the income hierarchy, and possibly everyone,
spends more on conspicuous consumption - including the individual with rank rˆ whose
income does not change (the location-free properties of the dispersive order together
with the smaller range of Gp ensures that there is exactly one point rˆ). This result
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implies, by continuity of the equilibrium strategy x(r), that those with slightly higher
ranks (and thus lower incomes) also will have to spendmore on conspicuous consumption
even though they have lower ex-post income. In other words, the increased aﬄuence
of those at the “bottom” of the social hierarchy forces those in the “middle” to spend
more on conspicuous consumption in order to “keep up” their social “place”. This can
be further demonstrated by the following example.
Example 1 Suppose zp = (1− τ)za + τμa, τ ∈ (0, 1), where μa is the mean income of
the ex-ante income distribution Ga. This is a mean-preserving income transformation
(so that μp = μa) and it is equivalent to a redistributive scheme whereby everyone is
taxed at a flat rate of τ and given a lump transfer of τμa. Those with income that is
initially lower than average (i.e. with za < μa) get an income subsidy, while those with
above average income see their incomes taxed away. An arbitrary ex-ante distribution
Ga crosses the corresponding ex-post distribution Gp from above at the mean income
μa, so that the individual with mean income μa sees no change in neither rank nor
income. However, by Proposition 2 she spends more on conspicuous consumption, i.e.
xp(G−1p (μa)) > xa(G−1a (μa)). By continuity, those with slightly above average incomes
will also spend more on conspicuous goods, even though their incomes are lower.
5 The Eﬀects of a Change in the Distribution of
Income on Equilibrium Utility
In this section, we will explore equilibriumwelfare in the game of status when individuals
are indexed by their rank. We begin with the following important question. Given the
existence of relative concerns, what kind of income transformation would guarantee that
everyone in the economy is better oﬀ? Recall that if we take the standard self-centered
approach to the consumer choice problem, the answer is trivial - increase everyone’s
income, and everyone in the economy would be better oﬀ. Yet a number of empirical
studies, from Easterlin (1974) onwards, have pointed out that economic growth is not
unequivocally happiness-enhancing. While this is often attributed to the existence of
relative concerns, there has been little formal research into this possibility.
The basic argument is that as incomes rise, a greater proportion of wealth gets
assigned to conspicuous consumption. When the value of such consumption to utility
is relative to the consumption of others, if all have high absolute levels of consumption
then everyone might be no happier than if all had low consumption. Cooper et al. (2001)
explore this idea in a multisector growth model. As we will see, similar considerations
are important here as well.
We consider equilibrium utility which is U(r) = V (x(r), G−1(r) − px(r))(S0 + r).
Using the envelope theorem, one can find that the marginal change in the equilibrium
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utility from change in rank is:13
U 0(r) =
dU(r)
dr
=
∂U(x, y, S)
∂r
= V2(x,G−1(r)− px)(S0 + r)
dG−1(r)
dr
(16)
That is, the marginal return to happiness from rank depends on the density of the
individual’s “social space”. Remember that from (8), dG−1/dr = 1/g(z).
We can use this to identify one model of relative concerns where growth can be
of no benefit to happiness. Suppose simply that U = yS. That is, conspicuous con-
sumption now has no intrinsic benefit and utility depends only on regular consump-
tion and status.14 Further assume that S0 = 0. Then, we have equilibrium utility
U(r) = (G−1(r) − x(r))r and, importantly, U(0) = 0. The lowest ranked individual
always has zero status and hence zero utility, independently of income. Further, we
have U 0(r) = r/g(G−1(r)). That is, the slope of equilibrium utility depends only on the
rank density. In words, in this model, the only thing that matters for happiness is the
relative distribution of income in society, not the absolute level. So, combined with the
unchanging boundary condition U(0) = 0, one can see that changes that do not change
inequality, such as an additive increase in income for every individual, have no eﬀect on
utility. In this extreme model, if we gave an extra $1000 to everyone, nobody would be
better oﬀ.
Note there are three factors that drive this strength of this result. First, the value
to conspicuous consumption in this extreme model is entirely relative (for example, it
only matters to you that your car is bigger than your neighbour’s not that it is higher
quality than those of twenty years ago). Second, we assumed S0 = 0, the lowest ranked
individual has zero status and thus always zero utility. That is, the poorest in a society
are miserable even if the society is rich. Note that if, in contrast S0 > 0 then by the
boundary condition (7), the lowest ranked individual pays no attention to status and
thus, like a neoclassical consumer, will always be better oﬀ with more income. Third,
specifically, we did not change the shape of the income distribution. As we have seen,
in these models, greater equality increases social competition.
Thus, turning to our general model, we can derive suﬃcient conditions for greater
happiness for all by taking into account the three issues raised above. First, given the
13As we mentioned before in footnote 7, the analysis of equilibrium utility under rank-indexing
approach is more diﬃcult than under income-indexing approach. To see that, compare equation (16)
with the analogous equation under income-indexing approach (found in the proof of the Proposition 2
of Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004):
dU(z)
dz
=
dU(r)
dr
dr
dG−1(r)
=
dU(r)
dr
g(z) = V2(S0 +G(z))
Thus, under rank-indexing, the analysis of equilibrium utilities is complicated by the presence of the
reciprocal of the income density, 1/g(z).
14This specification does not exactly fit our assumptions in Section 2. However, it is easy to verify
that a strictly increasing symmetric equilibrium exists in this case also. Second, it is possible to
approximate the results of this extreme model within our framework by using a utility function such
as xayS with a very close to zero.
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value of consumption is not entirely relative, higher income can raise welfare. But,
second, we must look after the individual at the bottom of the social hierarchy, so there
is the Rawlsian-style requirement that she is made richer. Third, one needs a reduction
in “competitive pressures” which can be ensured by a greater dispersion of income.
Again we compare outcomes under an ex ante distribution of income Ga and an ex
post distribution Gp. The respective equilibrium utilities are Ua(r) = V (xa(r), G−1a (r)−
pxa(r))(S0 + r) and Up(r) = V (xp(r), G−1p (r) − pxp(r))(S0 + r). We begin with an
intermediate result, and look at an arbitrary income transformation that leaves some
people with both unchanged incomes and ranks, and among these individuals, we look
at the poorest one. The next proposition shows that such an individual will be worse
oﬀ whenever those below her in the income hierarchy become more aﬄuent.15
Proposition 3 Suppose that incomes are weakly higher ex post, G−1p (r) ≥ G−1a (r), on
an interval (0, rˆ), where rˆ is the point of the first crossing of G−1a and G−1p . Then the
utility of the agent at that crossing point is lower ex post, Up(rˆ) < Ua(rˆ).
This result says that if incomes rise but some individual at rank rˆ does not have
her income increased, she is not indiﬀerent but is strictly worse oﬀ. This is because the
social pressure of others’ higher incomes forces her to increase conspicuous consumption.
Note that, by continuity, some people with rank just less than rˆ will also be worse oﬀ,
even though they now have higher income.
One might think that in order to avoid this problem and for everyone in the society
to be better oﬀ, we simply have to increase the income of everyone. Yet, as the following
example demonstrates, under relative concerns, higher income at every rank in society
does not imply greater happiness for all.
Example 2 Suppose that U = xyS, with S0 = 0.01 and Ga is uniform on [0, 1], and
consider a linear income transformation of income zp = 0.25za + 1.5, so that Gp is
uniform on [1.5, 1.75]. Then Up(r) > Ua(r) for all r ∈ (0, 0.92), while Up(r) < Ua(r)
for all r ∈ (0.92, 1].
Notice that in the above example Gp first order stochastically dominates Ga, and
everyone is (vastly) richer ex-post. Under the standard self-centered paradigm, that
would imply that everyone would be happier ex-post as well. Yet this is not the case and
indeed only 90 percent of the population is happier. This is because the transformation
that raised incomes also compressed them. More compressed distributions give rise to
greater social competition.
That is, in the games of status not only income, but also the degree of social com-
petitiveness that matter. This gives rise to simple suﬃcient conditions for everyone
15An implication of the issue we raised in footnote 12 is that it is possible that Up(rˆ) = Ua(rˆ) in the
non-generic situation we identified there.
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to be happier: a rise in incomes without a rise in social competition. For this to be
true, the distribution of income should become no more compressed in the sense of the
dispersive order.16
Proposition 4 Suppose that the income of the lowest individual is no lower ex post
G−1p (0) ≥ G−1a (0) (17)
and also ex post incomes are more dispersed
gp(G−1p (r)) ≤ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Gp Âdisp Ga (18)
then almost everyone is better oﬀ ex post: Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) and Up(r) > Ua(r) for all
r ∈ (0, 1].
In other words, a suﬃcient condition for everyone to be happier, is that, first, the
poorest person is no worse in terms of income (and thus of happiness - reminiscent
of Rawls’ criterion) and, second, there is a decrease in “competitive pressures” (as
represented by the income density of people with similar rank). Note that together
they imply that incomes are strictly higher at every rank. (Intuitively, since the lowest
person is no worse oﬀ, the only way to make incomes more dispersed is to spread them
upwards.) However, recall that we saw earlier in Example 2 that a general increase in
income may not be suﬃcient to increase happiness if the “competitiveness criterion”
of the equation (18) is not satisfied. That is, if incomes increase with an increase in
social density, then the eﬀect on utility is ambiguous. Increased incomes may or may
not compensate for the increased social pressure.
We have looked at the case where the income transformation results in an increase
in incomes. We now look at what happens when there is redistribution of a fixed level
of total income.
Example 3 Suppose that U = xyS, with S0 = 0.01, and Ga is uniform on [0, 1], and
consider a linear income transformation zp = 0.5za + 0.25. Then Up(r) > Ua(r) for all
r ∈ (0, 0.36), while Up(r) < Ua(r) for all r ∈ (0.36, 1].
Notice that the income transformation of the above example is a mean-preserving
redistribution scheme of the type considered in Example 1. Here, the bottom half of
the population is richer ex-post, yet only the poorest 70 percent of them (and thus the
poorest 35 percent of the entire population) is better oﬀ! The remaining 30 percent of
those whom become richer (which is 15 percent of the population) and all of those who
became poorer (that is the 50 percent of the entire population) is worse oﬀ. That is,
the above mean-preserving scheme, by redistributing income from the richest half of the
16In the extreme model, where U = yS and S0 = 0, if incomes are strictly more dispersed (inequality
(18) holds strictly) then utility will be higher on r ∈ (0, 1].
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population to to the poorest half, makes happier the poorest 35 percent of population,
at the expense of the decreased happiness of 65 percent of the population.
We can generalize the above example as follows. Suppose we change the income
distribution so that it less dispersed than before. We do this by increasing the incomes
of those with low ranks and decreasing the incomes of those with high ranks, and
increasing social competitiveness. Of course, this is consistent with the examples of
redistributive policies above. Then, we can show that the middle and upper classes are
worse oﬀ in this more equal society.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the income of the lowest ranked individual is higher ex
post
G−1p (0) > G
−1
a (0) (19)
and also ex post incomes are less dispersed
gp(G−1p (r)) ≥ ga(G−1a (r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ga Âdisp Gp (20)
and also suppose that ex post that highest ranked individual has lower income
G−1p (1) < G
−1
a (1) (21)
Then, utility is weakly higher ex post for the poorest but falls for the middle and upper
classes: Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) and Up(r) < Ua(r) for all r ∈ [rˆ, 1] where rˆ is the only point of
crossing of G−1p (r) and G−1a (r).
Notice that Gp is less dispersed than Ga in the sense of the dispersive order. The
result implies that a simple redistributive scheme, which takes from those with above
average income to supplement the income of those with below average income, will
reduce the utility of the middle and upper classes. Of course, it is unsurprising that
the rich would not benefit from such a scheme. However, an individual whose income
is unchanged (the one with rank rˆ) is strictly worse oﬀ and by continuity this will also
apply to some “lower middle class” individuals who have less than average income.
This is even though they have higher income post distribution. This is because the
more compact income distribution after tax implies greater social competition, greater
expenditure on conspicuous consumption and lower utility.
We lastly point out that as long as the the social competition is not too extreme
(i.e. S0 > 0) individuals at the very bottom of the distribution will be strictly better
oﬀ when the very poorest individual is strictly richer.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the income of the lowest ranked is higher ex post
G−1p (0) > G
−1
a (0) (22)
Then, if S0 > 0, the utility of the low ranked is higher ex post: there exists r˜ ∈ (0, 1]
such that Up(r) > Ua(r) on [0, r˜).
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That is, as long as the poorest individual does not face extreme social competition,
additional income for the poorest will make them better oﬀ. This is because when
S0 > 0, the lowest ranked do not take part in social competition (see (7)) and so do
not waste the additional income on conspicuous consumption. One should not take the
result that the very poor may benefit from extra income as trivial, because, as the next
example shows, once the poorest individual faces extreme social competition of S0 = 0,
those at the very bottom of the distribution can be worse oﬀ with higher income, as
any benefits are dissipated by high social competition.
Example 4 Suppose U = yxaS, with S0 = 0. Then we have U(0) = 0 irrespective of
income and U 0(r) = xar/g(r). Suppose we look at an income transformation such as in
Proposition 6 that raises the income of the poorest at the same time as increasing the
density. The utility of the poorest is unchanged at zero, but if a is small and the change
in density large, U 0p(r) < U 0a(r) in the neighbourhood of r = 0 and so those at the very
bottom of the distribution are worse oﬀ in the more equal situation.
6 Non-Rank-Preserving Income Transformations
We have been trying to emphasize that, when relative concerns are present, changes
in the income distribution can aﬀect agents through three channels: one’s own income,
one’s relative position or rank in the distribution, and the shape of the distribution. The
methodology of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) allows one to analyze individual decisions
and utility for fixed incomes, but is limited to comparing distributions with the same
support. Our current methodology allows one to make this analysis for fixed ranks,
and thus is particularly suitable for analyzing rank-preserving income transformations
(such as linear transformations of the form zp = a+ bza).
In this section, we present some situations which would seem to defeat both methods.
For example, suppose that incomes change in a manner that is not rank preserving and
which also changes the support of the distributions. While we have no formal results for
this case, nonetheless, one can still get some understanding of what happens employing
the rank-indexing approach augmented by the use of a rank transformation function.
Moreover, these situations highlight the importance of the third factor of analysis - the
social competitiveness (defined as g(z) in income space or dG
−1(r)
dr in rank space).
Example 5 Suppose U = xyS, with S0 ≥ 0. Suppose Ga is uniform on [1, 2], and
consider an inequality-reducing transformation whereby that the “lower half” (or every-
one with ex ante incomes of [1, 1.5)) receives an income subsidy of 0.5, but the “upper
half” (or everyone with ex ante incomes of [1.5, 2]) sees no change in incomes. Then
all incomes are now distributed according to Gp, which is uniform on [1.5, 2].
Here ex post everyone faces a uniform distribution on [1.5, 2], and their conspicuous
consumption choices are still determined by the equation (5). Given that the ex post
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distribution first order dominates the ex ante distribution, by Corollary 1, for every
fixed rank, everyone spends more on conspicuous consumption. However, here, the
rank-indexing approach alone is not suﬃcient to analyze what happens to equilibrium
utility of every individual. This is because this is an example of non-rank-preserving
income transformation since in the new, post-transformation, society, individuals with
ex-ante ranks of 0 and 0.5 both now have rank of 0, individuals with ex-ante rank of
0.1 and 0.6 both now have rank of 0.2, individuals with ex-ante rank of 0.49 and 0.99
both now have rank of 0.98, and so on.
However what we can do is to carry on the analysis based on rank indexing by
constructing a rank transformation R : ra → rp implied by this income transformation.
Here it is, rp = 2ra for ra ∈ [0, 1/2) and rp = 2ra− 1 for ra ∈ [1/2, 1]. As the result, the
ex-ante “lower half” sees an increase in both income and rank, while the “upper half”
sees a decrease in rank and no change in income. Clearly, the bottom individual (i.e.
the one with ex ante rank of 0) will have an ex post rank of 0 and a higher income,
and thus will be no worse oﬀ after the income transformation. But those near the top
of the bottom half (e.g. the one with ex ante rank just below 0.5) will have an ex post
rank of just below 1 and higher income and will be better oﬀ. In contrast, everyone
in the ex-ante “upper half” sees no change in incomes, but a decrease in ex-ante rank,
and an increase in density of individuals around them. In fact, one can show that they
will be worse oﬀ after the income transformation. Thus, using rank-indexing method,
combined with rank transformation, one can do analysis for non-rank-preserving income
transformations.
Non-rank-preserving transformations in fact highlight the importance of the third
factor aﬀecting one’s choices and well-being, namely, the density of the individual so-
cial space, or social competitiveness. As we pointed out before, an increase in equality
implies an increase in social competitiveness. While in the above example the eﬀect
was not strong enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of increased income, Example 6 below demon-
strates that one should not discard the importance of the social density. That is, one
can experience an increase in income and increase in rank, but a decrease in utility
because of an increase in social density, and thus an increase in competitive pressures.
Example 6 Suppose U = xyS, with S0 = 0.1. Suppose Ga is uniform on [1, 2], and
consider the following inequality-reducing transformation of income: everyone with in-
comes of [1, 1.1) receive an income subsidy of 0.9, everyone with incomes of [1.1, 1.2)
receive an income subsidy of 0.8, and so on, with everyone with incomes of [1.8, 1.9)
receiving an income subsidy of 0.1, while those with incomes of [1.9, 2.0] face no change
in income. Then all incomes are now distributed with Gp, which is uniform on [1.9, 2].
Again, this is not a rank-preserving income transformation since in the new, post-
transformation, society, everyone with ex-ante incomes of 1, 1.1, 1.2, . . . , 1.9 (and thus
ex-ante ranks of 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9) now have ex-post rank of 0, everyone with incomes of
1.05, 1.15, 1.25, . . . , 1.95 (and thus ranks of 0.05, 0.15, 0.25, . . . , 0.95) now have income
rank of 0.5, everyone with incomes of 1.099, 1.199, 1.299, . . . , 1.999 (and thus ranks
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Figure 3: Social competitiveness g(z) is important. When most individuals receive an
increase in income, while being “squeezed” into a small income range, the increased
aﬄuence of the “bottom” of the society pushes the rest of the society to increase their
conspicuous consumption x(r) in order to “keep up”. This may result in some individ-
uals getting lower utility even though both their income and rank increase. Ex-ante
choices and utilities are represented by solid curves, while ex-post ones are represented
by dashed curves. (Example 6: Ga is uniform on [1, 2], Gp is uniform on [1.9, 2],
U = xyS, S0 = 0.1 ).
of 0.099, 0.199, 0.299, . . . , 0.999) now have ex-post rank of 0.99. The corresponding
rank transformation R : ra → rp implied by this income transformation is as follows:
rp = 10ra for ra ∈ [0, 0.1); rp = 10(ra−0.1) for ra ∈ [0.1, 0.2), . . . , and rp = 10(ra−0.9)
for ra ∈ [0.9, 1] (Figure 3a). Here, ex post everyone faces a uniform distribution on
[1.9, 2] (Figure 3b), and thus, given their ex-post income and rank, their conspicuous
consumption choices are determined by the equation (5) (Figure 3c).
One can see from Figure 3d that almost two thirds of the society are worse oﬀ after
the transformation, even though 90 percent faced an increase in income. While the
individuals varied in what happened to their rank (those above the 45 degree line in
Figure 3a faced an increase in rank, those below the line faced a decrease, those on
the line faced no change), yet uniformly all faced an increase in social competitiveness -
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which as we argue, is important in games of status. For example, consider an individual
with ex-ante income of 1.45 and rank 0.45, whose ex-ante utility is 0.17. After she
receives a subsidy of 0.5, her ex-post income increases to 1.95, her rank increases to 0.5,
but her utility goes down to 0.12. Needless to say, those with ex ante rank [0.9, 1] who
had no change in income, now have lower rank, and face higher competitive pressures,
and thus are worse oﬀ.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we examined games of status where a large population of individuals
compete on the basis of conspicuous consumption. We find that greater equality can
increase competitiveness. We find, therefore, that a suﬃcient condition for an increase
in each individual’s equilibrium utility involves non-decreased income for the society’s
poorest individual, plus an increase in the dispersion of incomes. Together, these two
conditions ensure that income at each rank level increases (and thus an increase of
social aﬄuence in terms of first-order stochastic dominance), and in equilibrium, results
in higher utility at each rank level.
These results involve a novel methodology where agents are indexed by their rank,
rather than by income - as it was done in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). In this type
of games, the results can appear surprisingly diﬀerent, even though the fundamental
insights remain robust to the change in the indexing paradigm. For example, under the
income-indexing approach, an increase in social aﬄuence in terms of first-order stochas-
tic dominance leads to a decrease in equilibrium utility at every level of income. Yet
these apparently contrasting results are nonetheless consistent. The income-indexing
approach looks at individuals whose incomes were left unchanged by an income transfor-
mation. Thus, whose who did not gain from an increase in social aﬄuence, experience a
fall in utility because of the greater social competition from those who did. In contrast,
when one compares ex ante and ex post utilities at a constant rank, under this type of
transformation an individual of a given rank will have a higher income. If the benefits
of higher income outweigh greater social competition, utility will rise. But this does not
conflict with the result that individuals whose income is unchanged would see a fall in
utility.
Another important insight is that, regardless whether we index individuals by their
rank or their income, those whose income is left unchanged by the income transforma-
tion, tend to be adversely aﬀected by the increased aﬄuence of those who are below
them in the income hierarchy. This is because, in order to “keep up” their social posi-
tion, they have to increase their consumption of conspicuous goods further above what
would be privately optimal, leading to a decline in welfare. That is, it is the unchanged
income of the poor that was the main culprit behind the “equality hurts the poor” result
in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). Once we allow the income of the poor to increase
(which sometimes may lead to greater equality), the poor will be better oﬀ.
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Our third main insight is that in the games of status not only income and rank,
but also social density, or competitiveness, matter. We demonstrate that one can have
higher income and higher rank, but nevertheless have lower well-being because of the
increase in social competitiveness. Note that such income transformation is non-rank
preserving, yet we still were able to utilize the rank-indexing approach by augmenting it
with a rank transformation function. In fact, income indexing approach can be reduced
to a rank indexing approach with a suitable rank transformation.
Thus, given the similarities and diﬀerences in the two approaches, the question arises
- if one is interested in analyzing what happens when relative concerns are present, which
approach should one take? We can think of at least two situations where the income
indexing approach might be well suited. The first such case is where income transforma-
tions diﬀerentially aﬀect diﬀerent types of income - for instance, it aﬀects only unearned
income but does not aﬀect earned income, and vice versa, without changing the lowest
income. Given that individuals may vary in their income composition, income-indexing
can help to understand what happens to individuals who have only one type of income
(say, earned). Another situation would be one where individuals make decisions based
on their unchangeable abilities, or talents, and suppose that immigration changed the
composition of abilities in the country. Here, the endowment-based approach would
allow one to compare the decisions and well-being of domestic workers whose abilities
were left unchanged by the influx of new people.
However, we now think that the rank-indexing approach is likely to be more generally
fruitful in problems of social comparison.17 This is because it happens to be easier,
allows for a wider set of comparative static predictions, and seems to make more intuitive
sense. We also hope that this theoretical investigation will prove useful for empirical
analysis of the links between the distribution of income and happiness. In particular,
it makes clear that the results one obtains will depend on one’s choice of the method of
social comparison.
Nonetheless, both our earlier and present papers show that, when relative concerns
are present, people will respond to an increase in the aﬄuence of those who are below
them by increasing their own conspicuous consumption in order to maintain their social
position. Thus, whether we take the rank- or income-indexing approach, any policy
that increases incomes of the lower classes without a suﬃcient increase in the incomes
of the middle classes, will tend to decrease the latter’s welfare. Depending on the extent
of the policy, it may make the upper classes worse oﬀ as well. In other words, whichever
method of comparison is used, in these models of relative concerns, the middle classes
may be worse oﬀ with policies that change the distribution of endowments in a way
that has been traditionally considered to be progressive.
We should point out, however, that this work is best interpreted as an investigation
of the logical consistency of the argument that social preferences such as desires for rank
or status imply that greater equality is necessarily beneficial. While we find that in fact
17We hope that the techniques developed here could also used to advantage in first price auctions.
25
greater equality in this type of model increases social pressures to consume, this is not in
itself an argument for maintaining or extending existing inequality. For example, we do
not find that greater inequality makes everyone better oﬀ. In contrast, it is well known
that when people have status concerns, appropriate income or consumption taxes can
lead to Pareto improvements. The contribution of the more recent literature, such as
Corneo (2002) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), is to show that the structure of the
appropriate tax depends heavily on the underlying distribution of income.
Finally, we would like to highlight that the theoretical work on relative concerns
is still in its early stages, and thus does not take into account the full diversity of
real world social interactions. Here, we consider the importance of relative concerns
for consumer behavior, but there is significant evidence that such concerns are also
important in labor markets (see, for example, Brown et al., 2008). Furthermore, in
this paper, we look at individuals that are symmetric in a sense that they are identical
in all aspects apart from their endowments. Future research will, undoubtedly, look
into various forms of asymmetry among individual agents. One form of asymmetry
involves the possibility that, rather than comparing herself to the entire population,
each individual may compare herself instead to some - possibly idiosyncratic - subset of
the population. Another would be variation in the concern with status, and, moreover,
this degree could depend on one’s social rank. For example, Hopkins and Kornienko
(2008) allow for the return to status, the rewards in society, to vary in their dispersion
and find that this inequality of rewards has almost the opposite eﬀect to the inequality
of income considered here.
Appendix
Lemma 1 Consider a pair of distributions Ga(z) and Gp(z) which are distinct from
each other except at a finite number of points, both continuously diﬀerentiable with
positive densities on the respective supports. If the corresponding equilibrium strategies
are xa(r) and xp(r), then at any point r˘ such that xa(r˘) = xp(r˘), the sign of x0a(r˘)−x0p(r˘)
is equal to the sign of G−1a (r˘)−G−1p (r˘).
Proof of Lemma 1: First note that, given the equation (5), we have that
x0a(r)
x0p(r)
=
φ(xa, G−1a (r))
φ(xp, G−1p (r))
(23)
so that any point where xa = xp the relative slope only depends on G−1a and G−1p , and
thus the slopes are equal whenever G−1a and G−1p are equal. Furthermore, given our
assumptions that Vii ≤ 0 and Vij ≥ 0, we have that
∂φ
∂G−1(r)
=
V2
pV2 − V1
− V (pV22 − V12)
(pV2 − V1)2
> 0 (24)
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Thus, at any point where xa(r) = xp(r) we have that x0a > x0p (so that xa is steeper than
xp and thus crosses xp from below) whenever G−1a (r) > G−1p (r) (i.e. whenever ex-ante
income exceeds ex-post income), and vice versa.
Proof of Proposition 2: By the boundary conditions (7), the condition G−1a (0) ≤
G−1p (0) implies that xp(0) ≥ xa(0) (i.e. that the poorest individual, now that she has
more income, spends more on conspicuous consumption). Given our assumption that
Ga and Gp are distinct it follows that G−1p (r) > G−1a (r) almost everywhere on (0, rˆ].
Thus, by Lemma 1, xp(r) can only cross xa(r) from below except perhaps at the finite
number of points where G−1p (r) = G−1a (r).
We first rule out that that there is an interval where xp(r) ≤ xa(r). Suppose on the
contrary there exist at least one interval [r1, r2] ⊆ [0, rˆ] such that xp(r) ≤ xa(r). By the
continuity of xa and xp, it must be that xp(r1) = xa(r1). Note that
∂φ
∂x
=
−(V1 − pV2)2 − V (pV21 − p2V22 − V11 + pV12)
(pV2 − V1)2
< 0. (25)
By a combination of Lemma 1 and (25), it would follow that x0a(r) < x0p(r) almost
everywhere on [r1, r2], which combined with xa(r1) = xp(r1) is a contradiction to xp(r) ≤
xa(r) on the interval. Thus, xp(r) > xa(r) almost everywhere on [0, rˆ].
We next rule out that xp(r) = xa(r) at individual points. By Lemma 1 and the
previous argument that excludes intervals where xp(r) ≤ xa(r), this is only possible
at the isolated points where G−1p (r) = G−1a (r). But at any such point r˜ on (0, rˆ], as
G−1p (r) > G−1a (r) almost everywhere, we have that gp(G−1p (r˜)) ≥ ga(G−1a (r˜)). Now, note
that G−1p (r˜) = G−1a (r˜) = z˜. Next, we invoke the income indexing approach and consider
solutions to the game in terms of income z, that is, solutions to the diﬀerential equation
dx(z)
dz
=
µ
g(z)
S0 +G(z)
¶µ
V
pV2 − V1
¶
=
dx(r)
dr
dr
dz
=
dx(r)
dr
g(z) (26)
that we write xp(z) and xa(z) for the respective distributions. Then if xp(r˜) = xa(r˜),
it must be that xp(z˜) = xa(z˜). As xp(r) > xa(r) for r in (r˜ − , r˜) for some  > 0,
we must have xp(z) > xa(z) for incomes slightly less than z˜. Note that by Lemma
1, x0p(r˜) = x0a(r˜), and for the case of gp(z˜) > ga(z˜), it must be that x0p(z˜) > x0a(z˜) so
that xp(z) crosses xa(z) from below, which is a contradiction. This leaves us with the
possibility, as was mentioned in footnote 12, that it is possible that xp(r) = xa(r) in a
non-generic case of gp(G−1p (r˜)) = ga(G−1a (r˜)).
Proof of Proposition 3: Notice that since rˆ is the point of crossing of G−1a and
G−1p , this implies that G−1p (rˆ) = G−1a (rˆ) = zˆ: an agent of this rank has the same
income zˆ ex ante and ex post. Note that as G−1p crosses G−1a from above, we have
gp(G−1p (rˆ)) ≥ ga(G−1a (rˆ)). Again, for the non-generic case of gp(G−1p (rˆ)) = ga(G−1a (rˆ)),
we cannot rule out that xp(rˆ) = xa(rˆ) and thus that Up(rˆ) = Ua(rˆ). Yet for the
case of gp(G−1p (rˆ)) > ga(G−1a (rˆ)), Proposition 2 implies that xp(rˆ) > xa(rˆ), so this
agent now spends more on conspicuous consumption. By Proposition 1, in equilibrium
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x > xc, consumption exceeds the level that maximizes regular utility V . By the strict
quasiconcavity of V , given a fixed level of income, V (x, z − x) is strictly decreasing in
x for x > xc. This implies that Up(rˆ) > Ua(rˆ).
Proof of Proposition 4: First, as income is (weakly) higher at r = 0 by the boundary
conditions (7), xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and yp(0) ≥ ya(0), so that Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) (i.e. as the
poorest individual has no reduction in income she will not be worse oﬀ). Second, notice
that Up(r) > Ua(r) if and only if Vp(r) = V (xp(r), yp(r)) > V (xa(r), ya(r)) = Va(r).
Finally, the condition (18) implies that
1
gp(G−1p (r))
=
dG−1p (r)
dr
≥ dG
−1
a (r)
dr
=
1
ga(G−1a (r))
for all r ∈ (0, 1)
In other words, G−1p (r) is (weakly) steeper thanG−1a (r) on [0, 1], so that clearlyG−1p (r) ≥
G−1a (r) for r ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that Up(0) > Ua(0), and suppose, in contradiction to the
claim we are trying to prove, that Up(r) equals Ua(r) at least once on (0, 1]. Denote
the first such point as r1 ∈ (0, 1) and notice that it must be that V (xp(r1), yp(r1)) =
V (xa(r1), ya(r1)). But since by Corollary 1, xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1], it must be that
yp(r) < ya(r) in the neighborhood of r1. Furthermore, dV2 = V21dx+ V22dy, and, given
our original assumptions on V , it thus must be that V2(xp(r), yp(r)) > V2(xa(r), ya(r))
in a neighborhood of r1. Using the marginal utility condition (16), combined with
the density condition (18), it must be that U 0p(r) > U 0a(r) in a neighborhood of r1, so
that Up(r) can only be steeper than Ua(r), and thus can only cross from below. Given
Up(0) > Ua(0), we are done.
If instead we have that Up(0) = Ua(0), then, by the above argument which rules
out that Up can cross Ua from above, the claim can only fail if there is an interval
(0, r˜) on which Up(r) ≤ Ua(r). Then, there must exist a point r2 ∈ (0, r˜) such that
U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2) and V (xp(r2), yp(r2)) ≤ V (xa(r2), ya(r2)). But given (16) and the
density condition (18), if U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2) then V2(xp(r2), yp(r2)) ≤ V2(xa(r2), ya(r2)) at
r2, which can only happen if yp(r2) ≥ ya(r2). But this, combined with the fact that
xp(r2) > xa(r2) (by Proposition 2) implies that V (xp(r2), yp(r2)) > V (xa(r2), ya(r2)),
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5: Notice again that Ua(r) > Up(r) if and only if Va(r) =
V (xa(r), ya(r)) > V (xp(r), yp(r)) = Vp(r). From Proposition 2, we have xp(rˆ) > xa(rˆ).
We can then consider two cases. First, suppose that xp(r) ≥ xa(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Then, as
wealth for individuals with rank (rˆ, 1] is strictly lower ex-post than ex-ante, we have
necessarily yp(r) < ya(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Now, as xp(r) ≥ xa(r) and yp(r) < ya(r), we then for
some r˜ can find a pair (x˜, y˜) such that px˜+ y˜ = pxp+yp (that is, (x˜, y˜) are feasible given
ex-post wealth) but xcp < x˜ < xp and y˜ = ya. But then, V (xp(r), yp(r)) < V (x˜, y˜) <
V (xa(r), ya(r)), and the result follows.
Suppose now instead that xp(r) < xa(r) for some r in (r1, r2) with r1 > rˆ. If
yp(r) ≤ ya(r) on that interval, it is clear that Vp(r) < Va(r) and we are done. Suppose
instead that yp(r) > ya(r) on some interval (r3, r4) with r4 ≤ r2 (as incomes are lower ex
post for r > rˆ, it must be that r3 > r1). We want to rule out the possibility of Up(r) ≥
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Ua(r) somewhere on this interval. Now, it must be the case that Vp(r3) < Va(r3) as
xp(r3) < xa(r3) and yp(r3) = ya(r3). We have gp(r) ≥ ga(r) everywhere. Furthermore,
dV2 = V21dx+V22dy. Given that x decreases and y increases ex post on (r3, r4) and our
original assumptions on V , it can be calculated that, given (16), that U 0p(r) < U 0a(r) on
this interval. Combined with Up(r3) < Ua(r3), the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6: If S0 > 0 we must have Up(0) > Ua(0), simply because by
assumption G−1p (0) > G−1a (0), the lowest ranked individual has strictly higher income
ex post. Since by the boundary condition (7), the lowest ranked individual spends the
cooperative amount and behaves like a neoclassical consumer, a strictly higher income
must make her strictly better oﬀ. Higher utility on some interval [0, r˜) then follows by
continuity of U(r).
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